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The environmentAbstract
In this paper I show that a lax anti-counterfeiting policy is inconsistent with price
stability. I use a deterministic matching model with no commitment and no enforcement.
An intrinsically worthless but perfectly durable object called a ‘note’ can be produced by
banks at a given cost, but also by nonbanks at a (possibly) higher cost. Counterfeiting
occurs when nonbanks produce notes in equilibrium. When it is cheap for nonbanks
to produce notes, or the technology used to detect counterfeits is poor, counterfeits are
(thus creating inﬂation). Finally, I show that the highest welfare level is achieved when
counterfeiting is costly, or when the detection of counterfeits is of high quality.
Keywords: Counterfeiting, Inﬂation, Money, Limited Commitment.
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circulating in equilibrium and trade is only implemented with a growing stock of notes
JEL.Classiﬁcation: D8, E5
The public can be conﬁdent of the quality of the euro banknotes and their security features.
However, the Eurosystem, i.e. the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 12 national central
banks of the euro area, continues to advise the public to be alert to the possibility of receiv-
ing a counterfeit. The vast majority of counterfeit euro banknotes can be easily distinguished
from genuine ones by using the simple FEEL-LOOK-TILT test described in the Eurosystems
information material. (European Central Bank, Biannual information on the counterfeiting
of the euro, 2005.)Executive Summary 
   
Central banks being responsible for the integrity of the money stock can take three main 
measures to preserve it. First, information and training on the security features of 
banknotes can be increased. Second, law enforcement activities can be enhanced in 
collaboration with enforcement authorities. Third, a central bank can upgrade banknote 
features. The European Central Bank takes all three measures and continuously invests 
in new technology to discourage counterfeiters. As a result, the total value of circulating 
counterfeit euro notes is minimal in the euro area. A telling statistic is that a European 
citizen can expect to receive 1 counterfeit euro every time he/she receives 
approximately 14,000 euro.  
 
In light of this figure, it is surprising that the European Central Bank keeps investing in 
new, costly, technology to prevent fraudulent activities when losses caused by 
counterfeiting activities are so minimal. This paper relates the responsibility for the 
integrity of the money stock to price stability, the primary objective of the European 
Central Bank and most central banks. More precisely, I show that investing in new 
technology is vital, as a lax anti-counterfeiting policy is inconsistent with the goal of 
maintaining price stability. 
 
I use a model where money is needed for trade to take place. There are two types of 
agents, banks and nonbanks. Banks can print banknotes at a cost, while nonbanks can 
produce counterfeits (at a higher cost). Banknotes all have the same denomination. The 
cost to produce a counterfeit is interpreted as the technological cost of production, and 
is also used as a proxy for the degree of law enforcement. Therefore, as the cost of a 
counterfeit approaches the cost of a banknote, the degree of law enforcement 
diminishes. 
  
While goods prices are set, by say a market mechanism, nonbanks have an incentive to 
sell their goods at a lower price if the cost of producing counterfeits is low.  The reason 
is that lower sales revenues can be compensated by the production of counterfeits. Since 
counterfeiting is an unproductive activity, I find that welfare is maximized when there is 
none in equilibrium.  
 
Therefore, when the cost of producing counterfeits is low, nonbanks should be given the 
incentive to sell at the market price. Inflation realigns incentives as the number of notes 
in exchange for goods increases (each note has equal denomination): while the cost of 
counterfeit is fixed, each note has less value in an inflationary environment. 
Furthermore, the higher the inflation is, the lower is the value of a single note. Hence, 
there is a threshold of inflation above which selling below the market price (i.e. 
receiving a lower number of notes) cannot be compensated by the production of 
counterfeits any more.  Therefore, a low cost of counterfeit, that is a lax anti-
counterfeiting policy, is inconsistent with price stability.  
 
I also analyze the results of enhancing law enforcement whereby counterfeits are 
detected and confiscated by some authority. This reduces incentives to accept 
counterfeits. However, the results continue to hold.  
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Generally, central banks are responsible for the integrity of the money stock. There are three
main measures to preserve it. First, information and training on the security features of ban-
knotes can be increased. Second, law enforcement activities can be enhanced in collaboration
with enforcement authorities. Third, a central bank can upgrade banknote features. The
European Central Bank takes all three measures and continuously invests in new technology
to discourage counterfeiters. As a result, the total value of circulating counterfeit euro notes is
minimal in the euro area. A telling statistic is that a European citizen can expect to receive 1
counterfeit euro every time he/she receives approximately 14,000 euro.1 In light of this ﬁgure,
why should the European Central Bank, or indeed any central bank, keep investing in new
technology to prevent fraudulent activities when losses caused by counterfeiting activities are
so minimal ? In this paper, I relate the integrity of the money stock to price stability, the
primary objective of most central banks. More precisely, I show that investment aiming at
reducing counterfeiting is of utmost importance, as a lax anti-counterfeiting policy is incon-
sistent with the goal of maintaining price stability.
I use a deterministic matching model with no commitment and no enforcement, populated
with banks and nonbanks. Banks produce at a cost intrinsically worthless objects (banknotes)
that can be replicated (at a possibly higher cost) by nonbanks. As in Kultti (1996), I de-
ﬁne counterfeiting as the private provision of money. Hence, counterfeiting occurs whenever
nonbanks produce banknotes in equilibrium.
There are two types of nonbanks. As in Cavalcanti (2004) and Monnet (2001), nonbanks’
status alternates each period between ‘consumer’ and ‘producer’. Following Monnet (2001),
a consumer bilaterally meets a producer each period, but the identity of the producer is
uncertain. In each match, there is an absence of double coincidence of wants, as consumers
do not produce goods of value to producers. Consumers also bilaterally meet banks each
period. In addition to an absence of a double coincidence of wants, the environment is
characterized by limited enforcement, implying that money is essential.2
1In 2004, 594,000 counterfeit euro banknotes were conﬁscated, with an approximate value of 35 million
euro. This can be compared with the 9 billion legitimate euro notes circulating in 2004, with an approximate
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any exchange. This lack of commitment is also reinforced by the ability of consumers to oﬀer
fewer notes to producers. An allocation is deﬁned as the quantity of goods being exchanged in
a match. Within this class of no-commitment mechanisms, I consider all symmetric stationary
allocations that are implementable, i.e. for which banks and nonbanks have no incentive to
walk away or accept oﬀers.
One important feature of this framework is that a monetary equilibrium always exists,
unless counterfeiting is a costless activity. Additionally, when it is relatively cheap for non-
banks to produce banknotes, i.e when few anti-counterfeiting measures are adopted, I show
that allocations can only be implemented with counterfeiting and a high degree of inﬂation.
Moreover, I show that if banks’ money is costly enough to replicate, then allocations can be
implemented with a low degree of, or even no, inﬂation. In this sense, a lax anti-counterfeiting
policy is inconsistent with price stability. Furthermore, I show that welfare is maximized when
there is little or no counterfeiting.
The intuition behind these results is simple. When counterfeiting is cheap, nonbanks
are more prone to accept oﬀers consisting of fewer banknotes, as they can counterfeit them.
Incentives are realigned when nonbanks ﬁnd it too expensive to produce notes. This is the
case when they produce so many notes in equilibrium that producing an additional note
eliminates all beneﬁts from the exchange of goods. Therefore, to realign incentives, there
must be counterfeiting in equilibrium and the stock of money must grow.
In other words, inﬂation reduces the value of counterfeit activities, through the following
channel. While the cost of produce a note is unaﬀected by inﬂation, it reduces the value of
each note. As a consequence, the higher the inﬂation, the less attractive it is to produce coun-
terfeits. With inﬂation, while counterfeits can exist they are limited, and monetary exchange
exists. However, as counterfeiting is costly (and unproductive) and trades can be intermedi-
ated by banknotes, welfare is maximized when counterfeiting activities are minimized.
I also analyze the results of enhancing law enforcement activities whereby counterfeits are
detected and conﬁscated by some authority. This reduces the incentives to accept counter-
feits. However, in this environment as well, I ﬁnd that the main result continues to hold.
There are very few models of counterfeiting. Three notable exceptions are Green and
7
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 512
August 2005Weber (1996), Kultti (1996) and the recent work by Nosal and Wallace (2004). In Green
and Weber (1996) and Kultti (1996), counterfeiting can potentially be welfare-improving as
it can alleviate a shortage of money. Nosal and Wallace (2004) propose a more general setup,
where counterfeiting is harmful. However they do not ﬁnd equilibrium with counterfeiting.
The main contribution of the current paper is that, contrary to the previous literature, it an-
alyzes an environment in which money holdings are not restricted to be either 0 or 1. Among
other things, this allows the possibility for inﬂation, whereby a growing number of notes are
necessary to purchase the same quantity of goods. I ﬁnd that equilibrium with counterfeiting
can exist if the counterfeiting cost is low. Still an equilibrium with no counterfeiting always
Pareto-dominates an equilibrium with counterfeits. Therefore, when agents are not liquidity
constraint, counterfeiting is certainly welfare diminishing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. In Section 3 I
deﬁne implementable allocations, which I characterize in Section 4. There, I also analyze the
level of welfare that is achievable when counterfeiting is possible. I present some extensions
in Section 5, while Section 6 makes some ﬁnal remarks.
2 The environment
I consider the same economy as in Monnet (2001), with a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents.
Time is inﬁnite and discrete with t = 1,2,... There are three types of agents with equal
measure. One type will be referred as banks, and the two other types (labelled 1 and 2) as
nonbanks.
The main diﬀerence between banks and nonbanks is that nonbanks are endowed with
production technology, while banks are not. Type 1 (type 2) agents can only operate the
technology in even (odd) periods. They can produce perishable goods that are only consumed
by type 2 (type 1) agents. Hence, in odd periods type 1 agents will be called consumers while
agents of type 2 will be called producers, inversely in even periods. Nonbanks can produce
either 0 or q > 0 units of good. Each unit of the good costs 1 to produce. Consumption of
q units gives utility u(q). For later reference, q∗ will denote the socially optimal production
level (u0(q∗) = 1).
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A note is a durable and intrinsically worthless good. While the production of notes is unre-
stricted, the cost of production varies across banks and nonbanks. Banks can produce notes
at a unit cost of ε > 0.3 Nonbanks can replicate banknotes at unit cost γ ≥ ε. I do not
impose any upper bound on holdings of notes.
Consumers are also endowed with ω units of a perfectly divisible consumer-speciﬁc good.
Consuming one unit of this good increases consumers or banks’ utility by one. Producers
derives no utility from it. This good is perishable and, as a consequence, cannot be used as
commodity money. This good plays no role except that it allows transfers from consumers to
banks in a simple way. I further assume ω ≥ ε, so that with a large enough transfer of this
good, banks are compensated for the production of one note.
Within each period consumers can choose to be randomly matched with a bank, prior to
being randomly matched with a producer. Consumers always meet a producer in each period.
However, prior to the match the identity of the producer remains uncertain for any consumer.
No information leaks from any bilateral meetings and only those agents taking part in the
meeting know the outcome of their match. Agents discount utility by a factor β ∈ (0,1).
Agents cannot pre-commit to speciﬁc actions and there is no enforcement of trades. There-
fore, as Kocherlakota (1998) shows, in such environments characterized by an absence of a
double coincidence of wants, any exchanges will necessitate the use of a means of exchange
or money. Only banknotes and counterfeits can serve as money, as the other goods are
perishable.
In what follows, I focus exclusively on equilibria where agents are treated symmetrically.
Furthermore, I analyze only stationary allocations where all consumers receive the same
amount of goods each period. Notes are the only means of payment, but they are costly
to produce. Therefore, I will only consider the cheapest monetary mechanism to get active
trading. This implies that notes will only be transferred by consumers (and banks). Also,
consumers will always transfer all their money for goods.4
Social welfare is the discounted sum of all agents’ payoﬀ, including the cost of producing
notes. The transfer of consumer-speciﬁc goods to banks is a mere redistribution of utility from
3ε is assumed small enough so that a monetary equilibrium exists.
4Otherwise, since the future is discounted, the payment scheme would be dominated by another where
fewer notes are produced earlier on.
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for the production of banknotes and counterfeits in period t, and q is exchanged between two





t−1[ω + u(q) − q − ερt − γ˜ ρt]
Under the assumption that nonbanks produce notes that are perfectly distinguishable
from banknotes, Monnet (2001) shows it is socially optimal that banks produce the means
of payment for the economy. Here, however when γ > ε, banks have a natural comparative
advantage in producing notes. Therefore, I will consider the equilibrium where banks (and
potentially nonbanks as well) produce notes. In Section 3, I deﬁne implementable allocations,
that I partially characterize in Section 4. In Section 4, I will also show that welfare is highest
when there is no counterfeits circulating.
3 Implementable allocations
At this point of the analysis, a game (or a mechanism) is generally speciﬁed. However, since
I want results to be independent of a speciﬁc game form, I consider a general class of games,
without specifying all the details of a game, such as action sets, stages, etc. The result of these
games will include notes being produced and transferred in each match, and some quantity of
consumer-speciﬁc good being relinquished by consumers to banks. Also, in all these games, a
quantity q of private goods will be consumed in each match. I refer to this quantity q as an
allocation.
I restrict games in this class to satisfy two non-commitment criteria. First, in any match,
any agent is given the possibility to walk away, in which case both agents in the match
receive the autarkic allocation (i.e. no exchange takes place). Second, I allow consumers and
producers to agree on transferring fewer notes than dictated by the mechanism. However,
they are not allowed to agree on another quantity to be exchanged.
Agents can contemplate to play any game within this class of no-commitment mechanisms.
When they play a speciﬁc games, agents expect payoﬀs for each action they take. I now
deﬁne what these payoﬀs are, given the allocation q, the production and transfers of notes,
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and transfers of consumer-speciﬁc goods.I will let ν(mb,t) be the expected lifetime utility of a bank in period t when holding mb
units of money. If an allocation requires the exchange of nt notes for αt units of consumer-
speciﬁc goods, ν(mb,t) is:
ν(m
b,t) = αt − εmax{0,nt − m
b} + βν(max{0,m
b − nt},t + 1) (1)
Whenever nt > mb, banks have to produce ρt = nt − mb banknotes. However following their
money transfers, banks have no more notes in hand. Inversely, when nt < mb, banks have
enough to only transfer nt and they leave the match with mb−nt notes. Only oﬀ-equilibrium
will mb diﬀer from 0.
v(m,t) denotes the expected lifetime utility of a (nonbank) producer in period t when
holding m units of (legitimate and counterfeit) money. When a producer receives ˜ nt notes in
exchange for q units of private goods, v(m,t) is
v(m,t) = −q + βw(m + ˜ nt,t + 1) (2)
The lifetime expected utility of (nonbank) consumers in period t is slightly diﬀerent in its
structure, as they meet banks and then nonbanks in every period. In addition to being able
to produce counterfeits, they can also give up a share αt of their speciﬁc good to banks.
Therefore, the expected utility of a consumer is given by a pair of value functions:
w(m,t) = ω − αt + ˜ w(m + nt,t) (3)
˜ w(m,t) = u(q) − γmax{0, ˜ nt − m} + βv(max{0,m − ˜ nt},t + 1) (4)
Equation (3) denotes the expected lifetime payoﬀ of a consumer when relinquishing αt
units of the consumer-speciﬁc good to banks in exchange for nt notes. Equation (4) is the
expected lifetime payoﬀ of a consumer with m notes, when q units of goods necessitate the
transfer of ˜ nt notes. I will denote ˜ ρt = ˜ nt − m the production of counterfeits in period t.
Since autarky is always a possibility for banks and nonbanks, expected utility has to satisfy
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w(m,t) ≥ ω + ˜ w(m,t) and w(m,t) ≥ ω/(1 − β
2), (5)
˜ w(m,t) ≥ βv(m,t + 1) (6)




b,t + 1) ≥ 0. (8)
The left-hand side constraints imposes participation in any date t match, while the right-
hand side constraints guarantee that at any time, permanent autarky is not desirable. For
instance, the ﬁrst inequality in expression (5) imposes that, in a meeting with a bank, a
consumer is better oﬀ subscribing to the allocation than keeping ω and not receiving any
banknotes, entering the match with a producer with still m notes. The other expressions read
in a similar fashion. Furthermore, since consumers are allowed to oﬀer fewer notes, it must be
that producers are better oﬀ rejecting such oﬀers than accepting fewer notes and producing
q. This should of course be the case for all oﬀers n0
t < nt. Hence, the following incentive
constraint has to hold for all t.
βw(m,t + 1) ≥ −q + βw(m + n
0
t,t + 1) ∀n
0
t < nt (9)
Deﬁnition 1. An allocation q is implementable if there exist {αt,ρt, ˜ ρt,nt, ˜ nt}t∈N, and func-
tions ν(.), v(.,.), w(.,.) and ˜ w(.,.) such that (1)-(9) hold.
I now (partially) characterize the set of implementable allocations.
4 Characterization of implementable allocations
and welfare
4.1 Characterization
I will suppose for the moment that banks produce banknotes in exchange for some consumer-
speciﬁc good. More precisely, for each banknote produced, an equivalent share of the consumer-
speciﬁc good is transferred to banks. Consumers will have no incentive to fail to deliver
12
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producers. In case αt > ntγ, consumers would rather opt for autarky and produce nt counter-
feits. But αt should also compensate banks from producing notes, so that αt ≥ εnt. Hence,
we obtain the ﬁrst condition for implementability.
Proposition 1. For all t ≥ 1, if nt > 0 then αt/nt ∈ [ε,γ] and αt = 0 otherwise.
We also need a similar condition when consumers meet producers. Producers must ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to deliver q rather than producing in the next period the notes that should have
been delivered. Precisely, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If q is implementable then ˜ nt ≥ q/(βγ).
Proof. Suppose this is not the case, then the (discounted) cost of producing ˜ nt counterfeits
the next period is β˜ ntγ, and this is lower than producing q today. Producers in period t are
therefore better oﬀ choosing autarky and producing ˜ nt counterfeits in the next period than
producing q today.
The result above says that enough banknotes have to be exchanged between two nonbanks
(and the smaller γ, the more notes) for exchange to take place. This has an interesting impli-
cation. As banknotes are being exchanged, in the class of mechanisms considered, consumers
now have the opportunity to oﬀer fewer banknotes for the same quantity of good. This must
be incentive incompatible. As shown below, this implies that counterfeiting can emerge if γ
is suﬃciently low.
Proposition 3. If q is implementable then ˜ ρt+1 + 1 ≥ [u(q) − q/β]/γ for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose that in period t, a consumer proposes to acquire q units of goods for only
n0
t < ˜ nt notes. Should the producer accept? If it does then it will have to counterfeit the
missing notes next period and incur a cost γ(˜ nt+1 − n0
t), to be able to consume. Its payoﬀ is
then −q−βγ(˜ nt+1−n0
t)+β(u(q)+ω)+β2v(0,t+2). If it rejects, then it will remain in autarky
today and tomorrow (it will not ﬁnd proﬁtable to counterfeit the whole package of missing
notes tomorrow, as otherwise it would never produce), and its payoﬀ is βω + β2v(0,t + 2).
Therefore, it rejects only if γ(˜ nt+1−n0
t) ≥ u(q)−q/β. Now n0
t ≤ ˜ nt−1, and ˜ nt+1− ˜ nt = ˜ ρt+1.
Hence it will reject any oﬀer n0
t if γ(˜ ρt+1 + 1) ≥ u(q) − q/β.
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cheap relative to the allocation q and there is no production of counterfeits, producers will ﬁnd
optimal to accept low price oﬀers, i.e. oﬀers consisting of fewer notes than expected. To deter
producers from accepting such oﬀers, the cost of missing notes has to increase. This is the
case if a mechanism already requires producers to produce a (large) number of counterfeits.
Hence counterfeits will circulate in equilibrium, and the stock of (legitimate and counterfeit)
notes will inﬂate. Therefore, a lax anti-counterfeiting policy (a low γ) is inconsistent with
price stability.
To complete this section, I now show that there is at least one implementable allocation.
Proposition 4. Let (q,ρ, ˜ ρ,n, ˜ n) be such that αt ∈ [ρtε,ρtγ], ρ1 > 0, [u(q) − q/β] − γ ≤
γ˜ ρt+1 ≤ [u(q)−q/β] and ˜ nt = ˜ ρt+nt+˜ nt−1 for all t ≥ 1 with ˜ n0 = 0 then q is implementable.
Proof. Consider the following game. If consumers meet banks, they post a quantity αt of
consumer-speciﬁc goods. Banks then post a quantity nt of banknotes. Consumers and bank
then either accept of reject. If one rejects, then the outcome of the game is autarky. If
both accept, the posted quantities are exchanged. When they meet producers, consumers
post a quantity of notes. If producers accept (say ‘yes’ to) the oﬀer, q is produced and
exchanged. Otherwise, the outcome is autarky. Note that this game falls in the class of no-
commitment games. The equilibrium strategies are to always post the quantities prescribed by
the mechanism, and to always reject oﬀer that do not respect these quantities. In particular,
the condition αt ∈ [ρtε,ρtγ] ensures that in the case ρt > 0, banks participate and consumers
do not choose autarky when they meet banks. ρ1 > 0 states that there is a means of payment
in the economy. The two subsequent inequalities imply that nonbanks will not default if they
participate. Finally, agents will be willing to participate if the beneﬁts from producing today
and incurring the cost −q is compensated by the (discounted) surplus from consumption,
β(−γρt + u(q)). This is the case as γρt ≤ [u(q) − q/β].
4.2 Welfare
Given the (partial) characterization of implementable allocations, welfare results are easily




Working Paper Series No. 512
August 2005Corollary 1. If q, such that u(q) − q/β > γ, is implemented then given {ρt}t∈N,
W





Proof. Note that ˜ ρ0 = 0 is feasible. Moreover, as shown above, γ˜ ρt+1 ≥ u(q) − q/β − γ for
all t ≥ 1. Replacing this expression with equality in the welfare function gives us the desired
result.
Therefore the easier it is to counterfeit banknotes, i.e. the lower γ, the lower welfare will
be. The intuition is simple. As counterfeits are cheaply produced, the incentives to accept
fewer notes than envisaged by the mechanism are larger. Hence, counterfeiting is a necessary
feature of the mechanism used to implement q. In addition, the cheaper counterfeits are, the
more there are. Since counterfeiting is a counter-productive activity, welfare decreases with
it. The upper bound on welfare is not a continuous function of γ. For instance, if γ is zero,
no monetary equilibrium exists and the highest attainable welfare level is the one of autarky
ω(1 − β)−1.
As γ increases, the attainable welfare approaches (ω +u(q)−q)/(1−β), the welfare level
attainable in the frictionless environment. This is the next result.
Corollary 2. If q, such that u(q) − q/β ≤ γ, is implemented, then given {qt}t∈N,
W





Proof. When γ ≥ u(q) − q/β then either γ = u(q) − q/β in which case the result is obtained
by replacing this value in the previous welfare expression, or γ > u(q)−q/β in which case ˜ ρt
can be zero for all t as implied by proposition 3, and the above welfare level equals the given
upper bound.
In both corollaries, the upper bound for the welfare value is attainable. Note that in the
present framework, the second-best welfare level is attained when γ is suﬃciently high and
banks print one note in the ﬁrst period and then nothing thereafter. In this case, there is no
inﬂation and the ﬁrst best quantity q∗ is implementable. We obtain our third welfare result.
Corollary 3. Welfare is maximized when γ ≥ u(q∗) − q∗/β.
15
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In this section, I consider two extensions. The ﬁrst extension introduces a standing facil-
ity, whereby banks are producing banknotes on consumers demand. The second extension
introduces a technology to detect and conﬁscate counterfeits by some authority.
5.1 Standing facility
In the framework analyzed in Section 3 and 4, banks were not ready to provide additional
notes to consumers in need, i.e. they were not providing a standing facility. More precisely,
if an agent does not have enough notes to consume, it can only counterfeit notes, rather than
asking banks for the missing notes, in exchange for a higher share of the consumer speciﬁc
good ω.
If a standing facility were to be opened, banks could provide x notes in exchange for more
units of the consumer-speciﬁc good. As long as bank do not require more than γx of the
good for these notes, consumers would prefer to use the standing facility rather than produce
counterfeit notes.
However, a slightly modiﬁed version of proposition 3 would hold, and the stock of money
supply would still grow. If banks were to require less than γx for these notes, the stock of
money supply would grow more, as these notes are less costly to ﬁnance.
Hence, while providing a standing facility helps reduce the number of counterfeits in the
economy, it will not reduce inﬂationary pressure.
5.2 Detecting counterfeits
A legitimate criticism of the present framework is that it assumes that people have no moti-
vation “to avoid receiving counterfeit money” (see Nosal and Wallace, 2004). In particular,
no active measures are taken to eliminate counterfeit money, such as monitoring randomly
nonbanks’ money holdings. In this section, I consider this possibility. More precisely, I as-
sume that banks have the technology to check the quality of consumers’ money holdings. I
assume that banks check money holdings with a probability π ∈ [0,1]. If consumers hold
counterfeits, then banks conﬁscate and destroy them. Consumers can then decide whether or
not they wish to produce counterfeits in meetings with producers.
16
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counterfeit is conﬁscated by a government agent, the trader can either replace the counter-
feit or not. (...) What determines whether or not a trader chooses to produce replacement
counterfeit after conﬁscation is the essence of what [Green and Weber, 1996] study’. This
also answers the potential critique of Nosal and Wallace (2004), as producers would rather
not receive counterfeits since they may be conﬁscated when they in turn become consumers.
Now, we have to take into account diﬀerent histories for consumers. In particular, a
mechanism designer might wish to distinguish those “unlucky” consumers who were monitored
from the lucky ones. Still, for simplicity, I will restrict my analysis to the case where the price
of private goods is the same for all. This implies that unlucky consumers whose counterfeits,
if any, have been conﬁscated may have to produce more counterfeits than lucky consumers.
I let ˜ ρu
t be the production of counterfeits for an unlucky consumers. If a portfolio contains φ
notes, then either ˜ ρu
t = ˜ ρt + φ, allowing consumers to acquire the producers’ good or ˜ ρu
t = 0
if the cost of producing ˜ ρt + φ notes is greater than the beneﬁt of consuming q.
Working with this new framework only modiﬁes the value function (3) of consumers, which
now incorporates the possibility that counterfeits are conﬁscated. When φ is the number of
counterfeit notes in an agent’s portfolio,
w(m,t) = ω − αt + π ˜ w(m − φ + nt,t) + (1 − π) ˜ w(m + nt,t) (10)
Then the deﬁnition of implementable allocations is modiﬁed accordingly.
Deﬁnition 2. An allocation q is implementable if there exist {αt,ρt, ˜ ρt, ˜ ρu
t,nt, ˜ nt}t∈N, and
functions ν(.), v(.,.), ˜ w(.,.) and w(.,.) such that (1),(2) and (4)-(10) hold.
Since counterfeits are not recognized as such by nonbanks, propositions 1 and 2 continue
to hold here. However, in equilibrium with ˜ ρt > 0 producers know money transfers from
consumers contain counterfeits. Therefore, proposition 3 is likely to be modiﬁed. The question
then becomes: Given they can be conﬁscated, will producers accept fake notes, and if so, how
many?
Lemma 1. Given an allocation q, producers accept a portfolio of m notes including φ coun-
terfeits if βmγ > q + πβγφ and either
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2. (1 − π)[u(q) − ˜ ρtγ] > q/β and γφ > u(q) − ˜ ρt.
Proof. First, m is accepted in exchange for q if consumers ﬁnd producing m counterfeits next
period too expensive, i.e. if βmγ > q + πβγφ.
Now we have to distinguish the case where ˜ ρu
t > 0 from the one where ˜ ρu
t = 0. In the
ﬁrst case, a consumer will accept m if the expected gain β[u(q)− ˜ ρt]−βπγφ of accepting the
portfolio outweighs the cost q of so doing. In the second case, consumers only acquire the
producers’ good if they are not monitored. Hence, the expected beneﬁt is (1−π)β[u(q)−˜ ρtγ],
and it should be greater than the cost of accepting m, which is q. Finally, in this case, it
should also be the case that consumers do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce φ counterfeits,
since ˜ ρu
t = 0. This is guaranteed by γφ > u(q) − ˜ ρt.
From the lemma above, we see that the eﬀect of the ability of banks to conﬁscate coun-
terfeits is to limit the size of ˜ ρt and, as a consequence, the extent to which the stock of notes
is growing. However, as shown in the next proposition, the anti-counterfeiting policy has to
be very strict, i.e. π must be relatively high. In other words, in this environment, inﬂation is
only limited by once more relatively serious screening.
Proposition 5. Let π such that q/β > (1 − π)u(q). If q is implementable, then there exists
T such that ˜ ρt = 0 for all t > T.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that any mechanism implementing q predicts whether or not counterfeits
are produced. Hence, in equilibrium, agents know the composition of their holdings of notes,
although they cannot distinguish counterfeits from banknotes.
Let φ∗ be such that u(q) = q/β + πγφ∗. Then from the lemma above, for all φ < bφ∗c,
a portfolio containing φ fake notes may be accepted (if ˜ ρt is low enough). The argument of
Proposition 3 therefore applies. If at date t a consumer proposes to exchange q units of the
good, but only n0
t < ˜ nt units of notes, the producer rejects only if q/β+γ˜ ρt+1+[(1−π)+πφt]γ >
u(q), where φt =
Pt
s=0 ˜ ρs. Hence, either it is necessary that ˜ ρt+1 > 0, or else the result holds.
If ˜ ρt+1 > 0, then φt+1 > φt, and approaches bφ∗c. When φt = bφ∗c, the producer rejects
the oﬀer only if q/β > (1−π)[u(q)−(˜ ρt+1 +1)γ]. However since φt = bφ∗c, it is not possible
that ˜ ρt+1 > 0 as otherwise producers would not accept the portfolio any more (by the lemma
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As a consequence, producers will reject any transfer lower than the envisaged one. We can
then conclude that there is T such that ˜ ρt = 0 for all t > T.
Finally, in this paper, anti-counterfeiting technologies (the level of γ and π) are given to
the authority. An interesting additional focus for future work would be to devise the optimal
quality of anti-counterfeiting technologies, and analyze whether in this case counterfeits still
circulate.
6 Final remarks
In the present environment, I considered a class of mechanisms that implement trade when
private agents can counterfeit banknotes. In this environment, counterfeits may circulate in
equilibrium, even if there is a chance that they will be conﬁscated. As counterfeits become
more costly to produce, there are less in equilibrium. Somewhat surprisingly, higher counter-
feiting costs are associated with higher welfare, as this reduces incentives to counterfeit, i.e.
to invest in a counterproductive activity.
The most striking and perhaps novel aspect of the current framework is that counterfeiting
implies inﬂationary pressures. This result appears a robust ﬁnding for the following intuitive
reason: if counterfeiting activities are not costly, the money stock will rise, as more counterfeits
will be in circulation. If a central bank wishes to take action against this activity without
increasing the cost of counterfeiting itself, it will have to inﬂate the stock of legitimate money.
As inﬂation increases the relative cost of counterfeiting, it reduces counterfeiting incentives.
Therefore a lax anti-counterfeiting policy is inconsistent with price stability, although it should
of course be noted (Monnet, 2001) that there can be inﬂation without counterfeiting.
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